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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 I. 
 This appeal represents the third time this case has 
come before our court.  On both previous occasions we reversed 
Pelullo's convictions.  See United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 
193 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Pelullo I") (reversing all but one of 
Pelullo's fraud convictions due to the erroneous admission of 
unauthenticated bank records); United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 
881 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Pelullo II") (reversing all of Pelullo's 
convictions on the ground that it was error to invoke the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel with regard to the single wire 
fraud conviction upheld in Pelullo I). 
 The procedural history of this case, particularly as it 
involves Pelullo's first trial, helps place in context the issues 
raised in this appeal, and we begin with a discussion of that 
trial. 
 A. 
 When Pelullo was first indicted, he was the Chief 





publicly held corporation.  The indictment alleged that as its 
CEO, Pelullo had engaged in a series of illegal schemes to 
defraud Royale.  Paramount among these for our purposes was Count 
54 of the indictment, which charged Pelullo with wire fraud.  
Specifically, Count 54 alleged that in early 1986, Pelullo 
diverted $114,000 from a Royale subsidiary to pay-off part of a 
$250,000 personal loan owed to Anthony DiSalvo, a loanshark 
purported to have ties to the Philadelphia mafia.  The indictment 
also alleged that Count 54 constituted a predicate act, 
Racketeering Act 60, for a separate RICO count. 
 The government's case against Pelullo on Count 54 was 
based primarily upon the testimony of two government agents, FBI 
Agent Randal Wolverton and IRS Agent James Kurtz; and an admitted 
mafia underboss, Philip Leonetti.  In particular, Wolverton 
testified that Pelullo had admitted in an interview with FBI 
agents to using the $114,000 to pay-off DiSalvo.  In addition, 
there was testimony establishing that after Pelullo initially 
failed to repay the $250,000 loan, DiSalvo sought the assistance 
of Leonetti in an attempt to collect the outstanding debt.  In 
fact, Leonetti testified that he met with Pelullo in January 1986 
at the Florida home of Nicodemo Scarfo, the reputed boss of the 
Philadelphia Mafia, to inform Pelullo that he had to repay 
DiSalvo.  In late February of 1986, Pelullo wired $114,000 from a 
business bank account to a family corporation in Philadelphia.  
The transferred money was allegedly converted to cash by Arthur 





Leonard Pelullo's other brother, to drop-off at DiSalvo's home in 
Philadelphia. 
 In response to the government's case, Pelullo took the 
stand in his own defense and, among other things, contradicted 
Wolverton's claim that he had admitted to using Royale funds to 
repay his personal debt to DiSalvo.  Instead, he testified that 
the loan had not been paid-off until the Summer of 1986 and that 
the $114,000 in question had been used to repay an intercompany 
debt earlier that same year.  See Appellant's Br. at 10.  The 
jury, apparently unpersuaded by Pelullo's testimony on this and 
other matters, returned a guilty verdict on all counts of the 
indictment.  As noted earlier, however, on appeal we reversed all 
of Pelullo's convictions from his first trial, except for his 
conviction of wire fraud on Count 54. 
 Sometime after Pelullo's first appeal, but before his 
retrial, the defense obtained potential impeachment evidence from 
the government that the government had withheld despite Pelullo's 
repeated production requests.  The withheld evidence consisted of 
an IRS memorandum, which detailed Leonetti's interview with IRS 
Agent Kurtz.  The memorandum contained references to meeting 
dates between Pelullo and Leonetti that directly contradicted 
Leonetti's testimony at trial. 
 On retrial, Pelullo was again found guilty on all 
counts.  Thereafter, he filed a Rule 33 motion for a new trial on 
Count 54 based on the fact that during the first trial the 
government had withheld potential impeachment evidence in 





a duty on the part of the government to provide the defense with 
potentially exculpatory or impeachment evidence.  See also United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (noting that 
impeachment evidence falls within the Brady rule).  The district 
court denied Pelullo's Rule 33 motion, and Pelullo appealed that 
ruling as well as his convictions from the second trial. 
 On the second appeal, we affirmed Pelullo's conviction 
on Count 54 on the grounds that the withheld IRS memorandum did 
not lead to a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of the 
first trial would have been different had the government turned 
the memorandum over prior to the first trial.  See Pelullo II, 14 
F.3d at 887.  We reversed Pelullo's convictions, however, on all 
other counts.  Specifically, we held that the district court 
erred in according Pelullo's prior conviction on Count 54 
preclusive effect in Pelullo's second trial.  Id. at 897. 
 At some point following Pelullo's second trial, but 
before the beginning of his third trial (which ended in a hung 
jury), the government turned over to the defense three more 
pieces of potential impeachment evidence, which Pelullo's counsel 
had repeatedly requested since the first trial.  Pelullo contends 
that each of the three items undermined the testimony of the 
government agents and Leonetti and supported his claim that in 
early 1986, he had used the $114,000 to pay-off an intercompany 
debt.  This evidence consisted of:  (1) rough notes of FBI Agent 
Wolverton taken during an interview with Pelullo, which included 
the notation "repaying intercompany debt," a statement that had 





Kurtz taken during an interview with Leonetti, which referenced a 
date, "Summer 1986," which was not included in Kurtz's final 
memorandum; and (3) a series of FBI surveillance tapes of 
Nicodemo Scarfo's Florida home from January 1986, which do not 
list Pelullo as a visitor to the residence. 
 Prior to the fourth trial, Pelullo filed a motion 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to reverse his conviction on Count 
54 and to dismiss the indictment due to the government's alleged 
Brady violations.  The district court did not rule on that motion 
until after the conclusion of the fourth trial.  In a post-trial 
ruling, the district court denied Pelullo's § 2255 motion on the 
ground that the government had not violated its Brady 
obligations.  See United States v. Pelullo, 895 F. Supp. 718, 738 
(E.D. Pa. 1995) ("Pelullo III"). 
 Obviously this protracted litigation, with its wide 
audience (four juries and two prior appellate panels), has given 
rise to more than we have set forth above in terms of procedural 
and factual matters.  But our purpose here is to focus upon what 
we believe to be particularly relevant to what occurred in 
Pelullo's fourth and most recent trial. 
 B. 
 At the fourth trial, Pelullo was convicted of 46 counts 
of wire fraud and one RICO count, Racketeering Act 60.  The 
substance of the government's case against Pelullo during the 
fourth trial, including the allegations contained in the 
Racketeering Act 60 charge in particular, was largely 





fact, the only noteworthy difference was that at the conclusion 
of its case-in-chief in the fourth trial, the government 
introduced portions of Pelullo's testimony from his first trial. 
 With respect to Racketeering Act 60, the government admitted the 
following testimony from the first trial: 
Q:First of all, did you ever have any contact with Mr. 
Leonetti? 
 
A:I have knowledge of who Mr. Leonetti is.  I grew up 
in South Philadelphia.  I know these 
people from seeing them on the street 
and maybe running into them at a 
restaurant.  Do I know them well.  Do I 
associate with them?  No. 
 
 * * * 
 
Q:Do you know a man named Nicodemo Scarfo? 
 
A:I know who he is.  I know him from South 
Philadelphia.  I could have run into him 
at a restaurant.  I know who he is. 
 
 * * * 
 




Q: How did that come about? 
 
A:What happened was I was in Miami and a man called me 
by the name of Sam LaRusso.  Sam had 
worked for my father about 30 years ago 
as a laborer.  And he told me he had a 
job in Fort Lauderdale, would I come up 
and help him?  I said sure, Sam, I'll be 
up to see it. 
 
I went up to Fort Lauderdale and when I get there he 
tells me where I'm at.  I didn't know it 
was Scarfo's house.  And he said 
Leonard, he said, I need some help here. 
 There's a construction job.  I don't 
have any people here and I need to get a 
permit.  I said, Sam, I don't want to 







And I wasn't threatened, but the situation with Sam was 
that Sam was a prisoner, basically, 
until this work was done and he asked me 
to get him a permit, get him some 
contractors to get the work done, 
otherwise he was going to have problem 
with these people.  And I looked at the 
job.  I sent Kent Swenson there and I 
said see what you can do about getting 
him a permit and get him some plans and 
get the job done and let's get the hell 
out of here.  That's what I told him. 
 
Q:Is that the only time you were ever at his house? 
 
A:I might have been there twice with Sam, because he 
needed some technical help on how to do 
something and I tried to limit my 
exposure there, yes. 
 
See Government's Motion for the Admission of Leonard A. Pelullo's 
Prior Statements, Supp. App. at 1450-52. 
 This, in essence, was the nature of the government's 
case against Pelullo in his fourth trial, and with this in mind 
we will address the issues he raises in this appeal. 
 II. 
 Although Pelullo raises a series of claims on appeal,1 
we will focus upon the following four: 
                     
1.   In addition to the four issues discussed in detail in Part 
II of our opinion, Pelullo also raises the following four claims: 
 (1) that the district court committed two evidentiary errors by 
admitting alleged hearsay testimony and excluding the testimony 
of Peter Pelullo, Sr.; (2) that the prosecutor's rebuttal 
summation constituted plain error, denying Pelullo a fair trial; 
(3) that the fine imposed by the district court was plain error; 
and (4) that the district court improperly ordered the forfeiture 
of Pelullo's Montana ranch. 
 
 First, we do not believe that the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting certain testimony or in limiting the 
scope of Peter Pelullo, Sr.'s testimony.  Second, in our view, 
the prosecutor's statements with respect to whether certain 
government witnesses would lie, although troublesome, did not 
rise to the level of plain error.  Third, we believe the court 





(1) that due to the government's Brady violation 
he is entitled to collateral relief on his 
Count 54 conviction from his first trial; 
 
(2) that he was forced to take the stand at his 
first trial because of the government's Brady 
violation and, therefore, the government's 
reliance in this case upon the testimony from 
that trial requires a reversal of his 
convictions; 
 
(3) that his right to a fair and impartial jury 
was violated because of a juror's failure 
honestly to answer certain questions during 
voir dire; 
 
(4) that the district court improperly increased 
Pelullo's sentence following his conviction 
at the fourth trial. 
 A. 
 Pelullo claims that the district court erred under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 when it denied his claim for collateral relief from 
his conviction at his first trial on Count 54.2  More 
specifically, he argues that this guilty verdict should be set 
(..continued) 
"a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an 
offense may be fined not more that twice the gross profits or 
other proceeds," when it imposed a $3.48 million fine.  See Supp. 
App. at 1365 ("We [the defense] have indicated and the Government 
agrees, that the jury convicted of a fraud involving 
$1.74 million . . . . ").  Fourth, because the Montana ranch fell 
within the scope of Pelullo's property identified in the 
indictment, the district court's forfeiture ruling was consistent 
with the requirements of Rule 7(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
2.   Section 2255 states in relevant part that: 
 
 [a] prisoner . . . under sentence of a court 
established by Act of Congress claiming the 
right to be released upon the ground that the 
sentence was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, 
. . . may move the court which imposed the 
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the 





aside because of the government's alleged Brady violation -- its 
failure to turn over prior to his first trial the three pieces of 
impeachment evidence discussed earlier.  See United States v. 
Biberfeld, 957 F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing that 
Brady violations fall within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2255); see 
also Lesko v. Owens, 881 F.2d 44, 50 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Whether an 
error reaches the magnitude of a constitutional violation is an 
issue of law, subject to plenary review."), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 1036 (1990).  Pelullo contends that the government's 
suppression of this information rendered the guilty verdict in 
his first trial on Count 54 unworthy of confidence.  See Kyles v. 
Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995) ("The question [under 
Brady] is not whether the defendant would more likely than not 
have received a different verdict with the [suppressed] evidence, 
but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood 
as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.").  In 
deciding whether Pelullo is entitled to collateral relief from 
this conviction, we must consider the following two questions:  
first, did the government fail to provide the defense with 
potential impeachment evidence, specifically, the rough notes of 
Agents Wolverton and Kurtz, as well as various FBI surveillance 
tapes?; and second, if so, did the suppression of the evidence 
create a reasonable probability that a different result would 
have occurred at Pelullo's first trial on Count 54 had it been 
provided to the defense, thus rendering the violation a material 
one?  See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("[T]he suppression by the 





due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution."); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
678 (1985) (noting that "suppression of [Brady] evidence amounts 
to a constitutional violation only if it deprives the defendant 
of a fair trial"); Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1566 (defining a "fair 
trial" as one in which the verdict is worthy of confidence). 
 1. 
 We have no hesitation in concluding that the government 
inexplicably failed to abide by its obligation under Brady to 
disclose potential impeachment evidence.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that 
rough notes often may constitute valuable Brady material); United 
States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1996) (same).  As noted 
earlier, Pelullo argues that the withheld evidence clearly could 
have been utilized by the defense during his first trial to 
undermine the government's case on Count 54 by way of impeaching 
the testimony of three government witness:  Leonetti, Wolverton 
and Kurtz.  We agree.  See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 ("Impeachment 
evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the 
Brady rule.").  For example, the defense could have seized upon 
the notation "repaying an intercompany debt," which appeared in 
Wolverton's rough notes but not in his final FBI 302, to question 
the credibility of Wolverton's testimony that Pelullo admitted in 
his interview that he had used $114,000 to pay-off a debt owed to 
DiSalvo.  Similarly, the reference to "Summer 1986" in Agent 





included in his report, arguably supported Pelullo's claim that 
the loan to DiSalvo was not paid-off until August or September of 
1986, instead of February 1986 as the Government contended at 
trial.  Finally, in theory, the FBI's surveillance tapes, which 
do not include any mention of Pelullo, could have undermined the 
credibility of Leonetti's claim that he met with Pelullo at 
Scarfo's Florida home sometime in January 1986 to discuss 
repayment of the DiSalvo loan.3  Clearly, therefore, whether 
considered separately or collectively, these three items had 
potential impeachment value to the defense and, thus, constituted 
Brady evidence.  As such, the government had an affirmative duty, 
which in this case it ignored, to provide this information to the 
defense. 
 2. 
 The question whether the nondisclosure of potential 
impeachment evidence was "material," however, requires a very 
different and more in-depth analysis.  See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 
682 ("The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.").  The 
Supreme Court has cautioned that in making a Brady materiality 
determination, the focus should be upon an evaluation of whether 
                     
3.   In reality, the impeachment value of the FBI surveillance 
reports of Scarfo's home was questionable, because "no 
surveillance was conducted January 1, 3, and 5-21."  Pelullo III, 
895 F. Supp. at 738.  In other words, the tapes only covered 
twelve days during the month of January, 1986.  As such, they 
would likely do little, if any, to undermine Leonetti's testimony 
that he met with Pelullo at Scarfo's residence during that month 





the suppression of the evidence, when viewed collectively, 
resulted in a verdict unworthy of confidence.  See Kyles, 115 S. 
Ct. at 1567 (noting that the materiality of "suppressed evidence 
[is to be] considered collectively, not item-by-item").  
Essentially, therefore, the question we must resolve is:  when 
viewed as a whole and in light of the substance of the 
prosecution's case, did the government's failure to provide three 
pieces of Brady impeachment evidence to the defense prior to the 
first trial lead to an untrustworthy guilty verdict in that case 
on Count 54? 
 3. 
 We do not question that Pelullo's defense to Count 54 
during his first trial would have been more compelling had it 
included the items of impeachment evidence at issue.  Pelullo's 
defense to Count 54 was that he had used the money transferred in 
February to pay-off an intercompany debt and that he had not 
payed-off the DiSalvo loan until August or September.  Pelullo's 
defense was contradicted at trial only by the testimony of three 
pivotal government witnesses:  IRS Agent Kurtz, FBI Agent 
Wolverton and reputed mob underboss Leonetti.  Indeed, this 
testimony was the linchpin of the government's case against 
Pelullo on that count. 
 As noted earlier, each piece of withheld evidence could 
have been used by the defense to undermine the credibility of 
Wolverton's, Kurtz's and Leonetti's testimony and formal reports. 
 Because the credibility of the government witnesses was so 





reached a different verdict had Pelullo been armed with this 
impeachment evidence. 
 Moreover, the result of Pelullo's third trial indicates 
that the result of his first trial may have been different had 
the evidence been turned over.  At the third trial, when the 
evidence had finally been turned over to the defense, the jury 
failed to convict Pelullo on Racketeering Act 60, which charged 
the identical conduct as Count 54.  Of course, we cannot know for 
certain why a jury would be unable to reach a verdict, but at the 
very least, the result of the third trial suggests that some 
members of the jury may have been swayed by the impeachment 
evidence.4  As such, we cannot say that the guilty verdict on 
Count 54 in the first trial is worthy of confidence.  See Bagley, 
473 U.S. at 678 (holding that a conviction must be reversed "if 
the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression 
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial") (citation 
omitted).  Accordingly, because we find that the withheld 
evidence was both favorable to the defense and material, we 
                     
4.   The government contends that because Pelullo had the 
alleged Brady material before the fourth trial and was 
nevertheless convicted of Racketeering Act 60, the withheld 
evidence would not have made a difference in the first trial.  As 
discussed earlier, however, the defendant does not have to prove 
that he would not have been convicted had the government complied 
with its Brady obligations.  Rather, it is enough that confidence 
in the verdict is undermined.  See Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1566.  
While we do not find the results of either the third or the 
fourth trial to be dispositive on the issue of materiality, the 
jury's failure to reach a verdict in the third trial bolsters our 
conclusion that the verdict in the first trial is untrustworthy. 
 Moreover, the conviction in the fourth trial does little to 
instill confidence in the Count 54 conviction because in that 
trial the government introduced Pelullo's testimony from the 





reverse the district court's denial of Pelullo's motion for 
collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and remand for a new 
trial on Count 54. 
 B. 
 Pelullo also claims that the district court erred by 
allowing the government to introduce his testimony from the first 
trial during its case-in-chief in the fourth trial.  According to 
Pelullo, this testimony should not have been allowed because he 
was forced to take the stand at the first trial due solely to the 
government's failure to abide by its obligation under Brady.  In 
other words, Pelullo argues that because he had no other way to 
impeach the government witness, he was compelled to take the 
stand himself and rebut their testimony.  Thus, he contends that 
all of his convictions at his fourth trial were tainted and, 
therefore, should be reversed. 
 In support of his argument, Pelullo relies primarily 
upon Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968).  There, the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant's testimony, given after the 
government had introduced what was later determined to have 
constituted a series of illegally obtained confessions, could not 
be used against that same defendant in a subsequent proceeding.  
Because Pelullo cites Harrison as the chief source of support for 
his position, we will begin our discussion with an analysis of 
that case. 
 Harrison had been charged with felony murder and at 
trial took the stand in his own defense.  In the wake of his 





previously had been introduced by the government during its case-
in-chief, the jury returned a guilty verdict.5  On appeal, the 
D.C. Circuit reversed Harrison's conviction and remanded the case 
for a new trial on the ground that the three confessions had been 
illegally obtained, a clear violation of his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination, and were therefore 
inadmissible.  During the second trial, however, the prosecution 
was allowed to introduce the substance of Harrison's testimony 
from his first trial.  Once again, the jury returned a guilty 
verdict. 
 In reversing Harrison's conviction, the Supreme Court 
held that his testimony at his original trial was the 
"inadmissible fruit of the illegally procured confessions" and, 
thus, should not have been presented to the jury during his 
second trial.  See Harrison, 392 U.S. at 223 (noting that because 
Harrison apparently took the stand "to overcome the impact of 
confessions illegally obtained and hence improperly introduced, 
then his testimony was tainted by the same illegality that 
                     
5.   In contrasting the substance of the three confessions and 
Harrison's own testimony, the Supreme Court stated : 
 
 The substance of the confessions was that the 
petitioner and two others, armed with a 
shotgun, had gone to the victim's house 
intending to rob him, and that the victim had 
been killed while resisting their entry into 
his home.  In his testimony at trial the 
petitioner said that he and his companions 
had gone to the victim's home hoping to pawn 
the shotgun, and that the victim was 
accidently killed while the petitioner was 
presenting the gun to him for inspection. 
 





rendered the confessions themselves inadmissible").  According to 
Pelullo, his decision to take the stand at his first trial was 
impelled by the government's unlawful withholding of vital 
impeachment evidence.  In other words, Pelullo claims that his 
testimony at his first trial, like Harrison's, constitutes the 
inadmissible fruit of a poisonous tree. 
 As a general rule, a defendant's testimony at a former 
trial is admissible in subsequent trials.  See Harrison, 392 U.S. 
at 322.  When a defendant's testimony is compelled, however, by a 
constitutional violation, that testimony must be excluded from 
subsequent proceedings.6  Thus, a court must determine:  
(1) whether there was a constitutional violation; and (2) whether 
the defendant would have testified anyway even if there had been 
no constitutional violation.  The burden of proving that the 
defendant would have testified had the government not committed 
                     
6.   Seventeen years after Harrison, in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 
U.S. 298 (1985), the Supreme Court held that only coerced 
confessions violate the Fifth Amendment.  Today, it is unclear 
whether the government's reliance upon Harrison's illegally 
obtained (but not coerced) confessions would rise to the level of 
a constitutional violation.  See Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of 
Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 
93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 998 (1995) (noting that "considering the 
case's particular facts, it must be said that Harrison would 
probably be decided differently today . . . [because] the 
poisonous tree in Harrison consisted on merely McNabb-Mallory 
violations, not coerced confessions, and in Elstad the Court 
indicated that nowadays the poisonous tree doctrine only applies 
to evidence stemming from constitutional violations"). 
 
 In any event, regardless of whether Elstad can be read to 
modify Harrison to apply only to evidence stemming from 
constitutional violations, we see no reason to limit the 
application of Harrison in this case.  Here, the government's 






the violation lies with the government.  See id. at 225 ("Having 
`released the spring' by using the petitioner's unlawfully 
obtained confessions against him, the Government must show that 
its illegal action did not induce his testimony.") (citation 
omitted). 
 We have already determined that the government violated 
Pelullo's right to a fair trial on Count 54 by withholding Brady 
material prior to the first trial.  Thus, the first prong of the 
Harrison analysis has been satisfied.  We decline to determine, 
however, whether Pelullo would have testified in the first trial 
anyway even if the government had complied with its Brady 
obligations.  Instead, for the reasons that follow, we will 
remand to the district court to make this determination. 
 1. 
 Generally, we will review a district court's 
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.  See United States 
v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 1781 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing United 
States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992).  When, 
however, a district court's ruling is based on an interpretation 
of law, our review is plenary.  See United States v. Sokolow, 91 
F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 At the conclusion of Pelullo's fourth trial, the 
district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether 
Pelullo's testimony from the first trial had been improperly 
admitted.  See Pelullo III, 895 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Pa. 1995).  
The district court rejected Pelullo's contention that his 





government's Brady violation.  See id. at 740.  There are two 
problems with the district court's conclusion.  First, the 
district court's conclusion was driven largely by its 
determination that the evidence did not constitute Brady 
material.  See id.  Under the district court's analysis, because 
there was no Brady violation, Pelullo's testimony could not 
logically be said to have been "impelled" by that Brady 
violation.  Although not explicitly stated, the district court 
seems to have concluded that because the withheld evidence was 
insubstantial -- that its suppression did not affect the fairness 
of the Count 54 verdict -- by the same token, the evidence could 
not have been so fundamental to Pelullo's case that he would not 
have testified had the evidence been properly turned over.  
However, we have reversed the district court's holding on the 
Brady issue.  It follows that we cannot defer to the district 
court's holding on the Harrison issue. 
 Second, the district court concluded that Pelullo would 
have taken the stand even if the withheld evidence was material 
and had been provided to the defense prior to the first trial.  
See id.  In reaching this conclusion, however, the district court 
misallocated the burden under Harrison.  Harrison makes clear 
that the burden of proof lies with the government to show that 
the defendant would have testified anyway absent the 
constitutional violation.  See Harrison, 392 U.S. at 225.  In 
rejecting Pelullo's argument for a new trial, the district court 
stated that "Defendant offers no explanation as to why he would 





 Pelullo III, 895 F. Supp. at 740.  By imposing the burden on 
Pelullo, the district court committed error. 
 Accordingly, because the district court's conclusion on 
the Harrison issue was based on its finding that no Brady 
violation had been committed, and because the district court 
misallocated the burden of proof under Harrison, we vacate the 
district court's denial of Pelullo's Rule 33 motion for a new 
trial and remand for a new hearing on that motion consistent with 
this opinion.  On remand, the government should be afforded an 
opportunity to demonstrate, consistent with its burden of proof, 
that Pelullo would have testified during his first trial even if 
the withheld material had been turned over. 
 C. 
 Next, Pelullo claims that he is entitled to a new trial 
due to the misconduct of one of the jurors during his fourth 
trial.  According to Pelullo, after his conviction he became 
aware that Juror #229 had not honestly answered a series of 
questions during voir dire.  Pelullo alleged that this juror 
failed truthfully to respond to the following questions: 
(1) Is any juror related to or closely associated 
with anyone employed by any law enforcement 
agency, including the FBI, local police? 
 
(2) Has any juror ever been related to or 
associated or connected with anyone who was 
involved in the defense of a criminal case?  
Whether as a witness, party or as an attorney 
who defended the matter? 
 
(3) Has any juror, relative or close friend ever 
been charged with a crime in any court, 





See Appellant's Br. at 30.  As a result, Pelullo filed a motion 
under Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 33, seeking a new trial.7  Due to the 
vague and generally conclusive nature of the motion, the district 
court decided to hold a hearing to determine whether this alleged 
misconduct was discovered during or after the trial. 
 In general, once a verdict has been reached courts are 
reluctant to recall jurors to determine whether misconduct has 
occurred.  See United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 97 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  Thus, to prevail on a Rule 33 motion based upon 
juror misconduct, a defendant must establish as a preliminary 
matter that:  "(1) the evidence is newly discovered, in other 
words, that it has been discovered since the end of the trial and 
(2) that the defendant's failure to discover this information 
during trial is not the result of a lack of diligence."  United 
States v. Bolinger, 837 F.2d 436, 438-39 (11th Cir. 1989); see 
also United States v. McKinney, 952 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1991) 
                     
7.   Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
that: 
 
 The court on motion of a defendant may grant a 
new trial to that defendant if required in 
the interest of justice.  If trial was by the 
court without a jury the court on motion of a 
defendant for a new trial may vacate the 
judgment if entered, take additional 
testimony and direct entry of a new judgment. 
 A motion for a new trial based on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence may be made only 
before or within two years after final 
judgment, but if an appeal is pending the 
court may grant the motion only on remand of 
the case.  A motion for a new trial based on 
any other grounds shall be made within 7 days 
after verdict or finding of guilty or within 
such further time as the court may fix during 





("[A] defendant cannot learn of juror misconduct during the 
trial, gamble on a favorable verdict by remaining silent, and 
then complain in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was 
prejudicially influenced by that misconduct."). 
 During the course of the evidentiary hearing, which 
lasted three days, the trial court heard testimony from a variety 
of witnesses, including a Ms. Mitchell, the individual who 
allegedly initially learned of the misconduct of Juror #229.  At 
the time of the hearings, Ms. Mitchell had been employed by 
Pelullo's father for more than a year at his wholesale food 
store, Montco Cash and Carry.  In commenting upon Ms. Mitchell's 
testimony, the court observed that: 
[d]espite the new found information that the Juror had 
a sister who was the victim of a violent 
crime, smoked marijuana every day prior to 
trial and had a brother-in-law who was 
convicted of a crime, Ms. Mitchell did not 
disclose this information to Defendant's 
father.  Ms. Mitchell is not sure whether she 
ever disclosed this information to 
Defendant's father.  In fact, Ms. Mitchell is 
not very sure when or to whom she disclosed 
this information about the Juror.  All Ms. 
Mitchell remembers is that she revealed this 
information to Neil Eggleston, one of 
Defendant's attorneys, sometime between mid-
February and mid-March.  Ms Mitchell claims 
that she found Mr. Eggleston's name in the 
Rolodex at work and decided to call him 
without being instructed to do so by anyone. 
Pelullo III, 895 F. Supp. at 725 (citations omitted).  The 
district court ultimately rejected as incredible the testimony of 
Ms. Mitchell, choosing instead to credit the testimony of James 
Grimes, James Donahue and John Micofsky.  See id. at 727-30.  





and Micofsky, the court concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence from which to infer that Pelullo or, perhaps, his 
counsel had knowledge of the juror's alleged misconduct prior to 
the end of the trial.  See id. at 729-31.  Accordingly, the court 
denied Pelullo's Rule 33 motion for a new trial.  Id. at 730. 
 In our view, there was adequate factual evidence 
presented during the hearing to support the district court's 
finding.8  See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 
(noting that "when a trial judge's finding is based on his 
decision to credit the testimony of one or two witnesses, each of 
whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not 
contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not 
internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error").  
As such, we will affirm the district court's denial of Pelullo's 
Rule 33 motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. 
 D. 
 Finally, Pelullo contends the district court erred by 
imposing a sentence for his conviction on Count 54 that was 
longer than the sentence he had received earlier for the same 
count.  Because we will reverse Pelullo's conviction on Count 54, 
we need not address Pelullo's sentencing argument. 
                     
8.   An in-depth discussion of the substance of the three day 
hearing is set forth in the district court's opinion.  





 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's order on the § 2255 motion and remand for a new trial on 
Count 54.  We will also reverse the district court's order on the 
Rule 33 motion and remand for a new hearing.  We will affirm the 
district court's order in all other respects. 
